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Judicial Review: Its Influence Abroad
By DONALD P. KOMMERS
ABSTRACT: The doctrine of judicial review, having been
nourished in a legal culture and socio-political environment
favorable to its growth, is America’s most distinctive contri-
bution to constitutional government. Judicial review as
historically practiced in the United States was duly recorded
abroad, with varying degrees of influence and acceptability.
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
influence of judicial review was most conspicuous in Latin
America, where it was adopted as an articulate principle of
numerous national constitutions, while most European na-
tions consciously rejected it as incompatible with the prevail-
ing theory of separation of powers. Germany, Austria, and
Switzerland, although marginally influenced by the American
experience, developed, as did several commonwealth nations,
their own variants of judicial review. Since World War II,
judicial review has emerged as a governing principle, partly
in response to the excesses of prewar popular democracies,
in the constitutions of many countries, including those of
emergent nations of Asia and Africa. But in nearly all of
these new nations, including Latin American nations, judi-
cial review has not developed into an effective instrument
of limited government. On the other hand, it has worked well
in Japan, West Germany, and Italy, whose postwar constitu-
tions were strongly influenced by the United States. Recent
experience shows that judicial review works best in advanced,
middle-class societies firmly committed to the idea of limited
government.
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ALEXIS de Tocqueville, in De-mocracy in America, observed
that there was something very spe-
cial about the exercise of judicial
power in the United States. The
special characteristic, still pres-
ent even as the French observer
correctly reported it, is &dquo;the right
of the judges to found their de-
cisions on the constitution rather
than on the laws,&dquo;1 which means
that judges are at liberty to refuse
to enforce laws held by them to be
in violation of the Constitution. This
doctrine of judicial review unques-
tionably is America’s most distinc-
tive contribution to modern constitu-
tionalism. Nearly 50 years after the
founding fathers assembled in Phila-
delphia &dquo;to form a more perfect
union,&dquo; Tocqueville wrote in his
classic treatise that &dquo;the representa-
tive system of government has been
adopted in several states of Europe,
but I am not aware that any nation
of the globe has hitherto organized
a judicial power on the priniciple
now adopted by the Americans.&dquo;2
In this our Bicentennial year, 150
years after Tocqueville wrote, we
might ourselves glance abroad to see
what influence, if any, the American
doctrine of judicial review has ex-
erted on other peoples.
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT
Any assessment of the influence of
the American doctrine of judicial
review abroad needs to be pre-
ceeded by some discussion of the
ideas and forces which contributed
to the growth and durability of judi-
cial review in the United States and
to its significance in the American
system of government. It is worth
noting at the outset that judicial
review was not an explicit invention
of the Constitution. Rather, it was
formally proclaimed by the Judiciary
itself in the person of Chief Justice
John Marshall, whose celebrated
opinion in Marbury v. Madison
(1803) established judicial review
as a mainspring of the American
constitutional order. Marshall’s
opinion, which had ample precedent
in the colonial experience, advanced
the proposition that the Constitution
is the &dquo;fundamental and paramount
law of the nation,&dquo; a law of superior
obligation binding upon all political
officials and all governing institu-
tions and in terms of which all laws
and public acts are to be judged.
Marshall concluded, with a yawning
gap in his logic, that because judges
are bound by the Constitution, it is
within the particular competence of
the Judiciary to declare a law void
if in conflict with the Constitution.
But whatever the deficiencies of
Marshall’s logic in justifying the
ascription of such power to the Judi-
cial branch, Americans have since
almost instinctively identified judi-
cial supremacy in constitutional
matters with limited government
and the rule of law.
Yet the idea that governments and
political rulers must be subject to
an order of higher law has ancient
roots. The obligation of Athenian
judges to apply statutes only as con-
sistent with higher law is probably
the oldest historical antecedent of
judicial review. Medieval princes
and kings were also subject to nat-
ural and divine law, and this prin-
ciple remained prevalent throughout
the Middle Ages. For a brief time,
judges of the French Parlements dur-
ing the Ancien Regime also claimed
a power to nullify laws and execu-
1. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in
America (London. Oxford University Press,
1952), p. 79.
2. Ibid., p. 77.
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tive decrees that were in violation
of the fundamental laws of the realm.
In England, Sir Edward Coke’s
opinions asserted the supremacy of
the Common Law and the Magna
Charta over parliamentary statutes,
and many colonial leaders who were
influenced by Coke-especially
by his Institutes-and opposed
to the exercise of the royal preroga-
tive over their affairs formally ap-
proved of the doctrine of judicial
supremacy. But the principle that
judges should be the guardians of
the constitution prevailed only in
America. In England, Coke’s view
was totally rejected, and the princi-
ple of parliamentry supremacy was
fully affirmed in the aftermath
of the conflict between king and
Parliament. In France, the coming
of the French Revolution and the
accompanying doctrine of popular
sovereignty ended the judicial prac-
tice of voiding legislation. Indeed,
it was the French doctrine of separa-
tion of powers that prevailed in most
of Europe.
Although judicial review as known
in the United States was rejected in
Europe, a firm tradition of constitu-
tional government existed in the
positivistic legal cultures of the con-
tinental civil law tradition. This tra-
dition, unlike the Anglo-American
tradition, regarded the state-
whose general will was personified
by a national assembly-as the
source of all law, even of constitu-
tional law. It also insisted that law
be founded on human reason and
promulgated for the commonweal.
Rationality and generality were thus
indispensable properties of a govern-
ment ruled by law. Generality
ensured that citizens would be
treated equally under the law, while
rationality required that the law
itself be reasonable. Under the
European variant of separation of
powers, all lawmaking authority
within the state was vested in the
sovereign legislature, while the role
of the independent judiciary was to
interpret the legislature’s will and
to administer the law as written.
For a judge to set aside the law,
whatever the reason, was to the
European mind, schooled in analy-
tical jurisprudence, the very defini-
tion of arbitrary government. Thus,
given such a tradition, the liberty
and security of the individual in
much of Europe was identified
with equal administration of justice
under law, Europe’s principal con-
tribution to the theory of constitu-
tionalism. This notion of constitu-
tional government did not imply
democratic political institutions,
however. Parliamentary democracy,
which also excluded judicial review,
was England’s contribution to con-
stitutionalism ; to this heritage the
United States added the concept of
judicial review.
LIMITS ON PRIVATE AND
GOVERNMENTAL POWER
The American notion of free
government provided very suitable
soil for the growth of judicial review.
The reasons for its success here may
possibly help to explain both its
acceptance and its rejection in other
parts of the world. Moored to the
political theories of Locke and Mon-
tesquieu, the founders firmly be-
lieved in the respective doctrines of
natural rights and balanced govern-
ment. Balanced government to them
was synonomous with limited
government. To avoid the concentra-
tion of political power in any one
person or institution, they housed
the familiar triad of government
powers-executive, legislative, and
judicial-in separate structures
buttressed by a system of checks and
balances. At the same time, they
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believed that government existed to
protect the natural rights of men and
to establish a political order de-
signed to help men pursue their
personal happiness. The fulfillment
of private ambition and aspiration,
endorsed and assisted by a solicitous
government, came close to a good
American definition of the public
interest in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries.
Yet the founders regarded all
power as potentially corruptible,
and they wondered how to limit pri-
vate as well as governmental power.
Madison provided one answer, indi-
cating that private power could be
brought under control within a con-
stitutional order which fostered the
diversity and multiplication of fac-
tions. If enough factions occupied
the political space of the new Ameri-
can Republic, he argued, the power
of each faction would be checked by
the countervailing power of compet-
ing factions, allowing not one of
them to gain a monopoly of power.
At the same time, the power of gov-
ernment generally would be held at
bay by the proliferation and cumula-
tive influence of private institutions
and groups. Thus, in Madison’s
thought-which became our con-
ventional wisdom-freedom ulti-
mately was to be based upon the
interplay and countervailing thrusts
of private and public power.
Judicial review worked supremely
well within a legal order character-
ized by an obsession with individual
liberty, an economic order based on
private property, and a constitu-
tional order of separated powers.
Tocqueville saw this clearly. &dquo;Few
laws can escape the searching analy-
sis of the judicial power for any
length of time,&dquo; he wrote, &dquo;for there
are few which are not prejudiced to
some private interest or other, and
none which may not be brought
before a court of justice by the choice
of parties, or by the necessity of the
case.&dquo;3 He also noted that laws which
judges refuse to apply, owing to their
constitutional invalidity, tend to lose
their &dquo;moral cogency,&dquo; which he
wisely discerned to be the real signif-
icance of judicial review in America.
THREE PERIODS OF INFLUENCE
State and federal authority: 1789-
1870s
The story of judicial review’s
influence abroad is partly inter-
woven with the distinct roles played
by the United States Supreme Court
in various historical eras. (Like all
historical epochs, these eras nat-
urally overlap, but for our purposes
a liberal division of Supreme Court
history is appropriate.) During each
of these eras, judicial review as
practiced in America was duly re-
corded abroad, with varying degrees
of influence and acceptability. In the
first period, from 1789 to the mid-
1870s, the Supreme Court was pre-
occupied with defining the bound-
ary between state and federal au-
thority and buttressing its own
authority as well in the American
political order. It was this history
that was most familiar to constitu-
tion-makers in Latin America and
continental Europe when they be-
gan to erect representative republics
and draft written constitutions in the
nineteenth century.
During this period, the American
influence was most notable in Latin
America. Although rooted in the
civil law tradition, various Latin
American countries, copying from
the colossus of the north, entrusted
the power of judicial review to their
courts on a broad scale. The Argen-
tine constitution of 1860 and the
3. Ibid., p. 81.
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Brazilian constitution of 1891 con-
tained provisions on judicial review
consciously copied from the Ameri-
can experience. These constitutions,
like the Canadian constitution of
1867 (British North American Act) and
the Australian constitution of 1900,
established judicial review as a
necessary concomitant of federalism.
Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v.
Maryland (1819) constituted a sig-
nificant point of departure for the
consideration of federal-state rela-
tions by the judiciary in each of these
nations. Mexico, which has also had
a system of government with strong
federal characteristics, has had a
more limited variant of judicial
review. Nevertheless, Tocqueville
himself has been credited with in-
fluencing the adoption of judicial
review by Mexico’s constitution of
1857. As one legal scholar reports,
&dquo;the immediate source of amparo
[a proceeding initiated by an indi-
vidual citizen to challenge an arbi-
trary governmental act] must be
found in the American institution of
judicial review transmitted to the
Mexicans through Tocqueville’s
Democracy in America.&dquo;4 Finally,
Costa Rica adopted the American
plan of judicial review in 1871.
Shifting briefly to Europe, we find
that judicial review was well known
to many German legal scholars in the
early nineteenth century through
the classic work on American con-
stitutionalism by Robert von Mohl.5 5
Von Mohl, a member of the Frank-
furt Parliament, had a hand in draft-
ing the constitution of 1848, which
provided for a high court of constitu-
tional review modeled after the
American Supreme Court. &dquo;Consti-
tutional review,&dquo; however, had a
different meaning in Europe than
did &dquo;judicial review&dquo; in America.
&dquo;Constitutional review&dquo; was a
power exercised by a specialized
constitutional court to decide con-
stitutional controversies only be-
tween organs and levels of govern-
ment. But these specialized courts,
which also existed under several
mid-nineteenth-century German
state constitutions, were not attribut-
able to any American influence;
rather, they had their institutional
antecedent in the fifteenth-century
court of the Imperial Chamber, be-
fore which warring princes took
their disputes. Uniquely European,
these institutions nevertheless con-
stituted convenient vehicles for the
reception of judicial review more re-
lated to the American pattern. Swit-
zerland was the real pioneer of
European judicial review. Under the
1848 Swiss bill of rights, a citizen
could challenge a cantonal (state)
law allegedly in violation of a funda-
mental right in the federal parlia-
ment. Parliament, if it saw fit,
might then place the case before the
federal court. Still, the legal order
predominant in Europe in the 1800s
was generally incompatible with ju-
dicial review, and even in those
countries where traces of American
influence were visible, the prin-
ciples of popular sovereignty and
the European variant of separation
of powers remained wholly uncom-
promised by judicial review.
Rights of contract and property:
1870s -1937
In the second period of judicial
review, covering the late postbellum
period era down to 1937, the Su-
preme Court used its authority in
4. Richard D. Baker, Judicial Review in
Mexico (Austin: The University of Texas
Press, 1971), p. 33.
5. For a discussion ofvon Mohl’s influence,
see Gottfried Dietze, "Robert von Mohl,
Germany’s de Tocqueville," in Dietze, ed.,
Essays on the American Constitution (Engle-
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964),
pp. 184-212.
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large measure to protect the rights
of contract and property against
invasion by both state and federal
governments. Mirroring the entre-
prenurial spirit of a &dquo;gilded age,&dquo;
and infused ideologically by social
Darwinism and the Gospel of
Wealth, the Supreme Court wove a
garland of constitutional principles
that crowned American capitalism.
This history was most familiar to
European nations before and after
World War I as they sought to anchor
representative government in their
own newly written constitutions.
Austria, Germany, and Czecho-
slovakia, following the European
tradition of constitutional review,
established specialized constitu-
tional tribunals independent of the
regular judiciary and vested with
jurisdiction limited to appeals by
national or state governments and,
in the case of Czechoslovakia, to the
Supreme Court of Justice. Often
referred to as &dquo;political courts,&dquo; they
were designed largely as forums in
which to settle constitutional dis-
putes between levels and units of
government. Individual citizens
were not permitted to file petitions
in these tribunals. Hans Kelsen, the
father of the Austrian constitution of
1920, although acknowledging his
debt to American constitutional
practice in prescribing the consti-
tutional court, was convinced of the
superiority of a system which com-
pletely separated constitutional
from ordinary adjudication.~ On the
other hand, the regular judicial
establishments of Denmark, Norway,
and Rumania claimed to have the
authority to review legislation,
mainly to protect property rights,
but very few laws actually were
struck down. Their legal orders were
simply not congenial to the principle
of judicial supremacy in constitu-
tional matters. The Polish constitu-
tion of 1921 actually banned the
courts from reviewing legislation on
constitutional grounds.~ 7
In continental Europe, the Ameri-
can influence was most perceptible
in Germany, where judicial review
was debated in the Weimar National
Assembly. The &dquo;founding fathers&dquo;
seemed about evenly split on judi-
cial review, for it missed being
expressly put into the 1919 consti-
tution by a single committee vote.
But the founders did not expressly
forbid judicial review either, failing
to heed the warning of Hugo Preuss-
Germany’s leading authority on con-
stitutional law-that the courts
would exercise judicial review if the
constitution did not expressly forbid
it. While some spokesmen argued
that judicial review was incompat-
ible with the principle of separation
of powers, other more socially con-
scious delegates were undoubtedly
aware of the conservative uses of
judicial review in the United States.
They may also have been mindful
of an 1875 decision by the Hanseatic
Court of Appeals which invalidated
a local tax law as violative of the right
to property under the Bremen con-
stitution. (The first recorded in-
stance of judicial review in Ger-
many, the decision was quickly
overruled by the Imperial Court
which rejected the authority of
judges to review the constitution-
ality of laws.)8
6. See Hans Kelsen, "Judicial Review of
Legislation: A Comparative Study of the
Austrian and the American Constitutions,"
Journal of Politics, vol. 4 (1942), pp. 183-200.
7. A survey of judicial review in all of the
countries discussed above may be found in
Charles Grove Haines, The American Doc-
trine of Judicial Supremacy (New York:
Russell G. Russell, Inc., 1959), pp. 573-662.
8. See Donald P. Kommers, Judicial Poli-
tics in West Germany. A Study of the Federal
Constitutional Court (Beverly Hills, Cal..
Sage Publications, Inc., 1976), p. 36
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Preuss’s prediction came true as
several German high courts claimed
the power of judicial review even
over national laws. Indeed, the High
Court of Justice voided two national
laws in the 1920s, one on the ground
that the constitutional right to prop-
erty had been violated, which gener-
ated another full-dress debate on
judicial review by German legal
scholars. Still, Walter C. Simon,
president of the High Court during
this time (1922-29), was disap-
pointed in his effort firmly to estab-
lish judicial review. Clearly influ-
enced by the American experience,
he noted: &dquo;During the seven years
of my office, I have tried to heighten
the position of the Reichsgericht
unceasingly but unsuccessfully. I
wanted it to be like the Supreme
Court of the United States, a high
organ of the Commonwealth equal
in rank to the Cabinet, having imme-
diate intercourse with the President
of the Republic .... Until now,
the Reichsgericht has not found a
Chief Justice Marshall.&dquo; But Simon
betrayed a revealing distrust of the
political process when he remarked
further:
... in my opinion a republican com-
monwealth will never find a check on the
overbearing power of parliamentari-
anism and the secret influence of min-
isterial bureaucracy if the Supreme
Court is not perfectly independent
and on the same footing with both the
other powers of the state.9
In the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, judicial review
continued its growth, at least in
terms of its acceptability as a prin-
ciple. At least 10 additional Latin
American nations (Bolivia, 1880;
Brazil, 1891; Colombia, 1886; Hon-
duras, 1894; Cuba, 1901; Nicaragua,
1911; Haiti, 1918; Uruguay, 1919;
Chile, 1925; and Venezuela, 1928)
adopted various aspects of American
judicial review. Most constitutional
provisions favoring judicial review
were adopted in unthinking imita-
tion of the American model, for judi-
cial review simply was not suited
to regimes marked by political insta-
bility and constitutional disconti-
nuities. Only in the then relatively
durable constitutional orders of
Chile, Brazil, and Colombia did
judicial review become an operative
principle.
The origin of judicial review in
Canada, Australia, Ireland, and other
countries with present or past links
to the British Commonwealth is not
so clearly the product of American
influence. Their high courts are the
lineal successors of the old Privy
Council. As McWhinney remarks,
&dquo;In its historical origins, judicial
review of the Constitution in the
Commonwealth Countries was
simply part of the apparatus of
Empire-a projection of Imperial
power in legal institutional form.&dquo;lo
Here also judicial review developed
on a far more restricted scale than
in the United States. McWhinney’s
summary indicates the multiple
influences that account for judicial
review in these countries:
Judicial review of the constitution in the
Commonwealth Countries today is an
organic growth stemming in part from
the accidents of past imperial associa-
tions ; in part from conscious reception,
in more recent times, of American legal
ideas; and in part from the pragmatic,
trial and error, case-by-case, experiential
development inherent in the Common
Law and Common Law-derived legal
systems.’1
9. Walter C. Simon, "Relation of the Ger-
man Judiciary to the Executive and Legis-
lative Branches," American Bar Association
Journal, vol. 15 (1929), p. 762.
10. Herman Mosler, ed., Constitutional
Review in the World Today (Berlin: Carl
Heymanns Verlag KG, 1962), p. 77.
11. Ibid., p. 87.
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Civil rights: 1937-present
In the third period of judicial
review, from 1937 down to the pres-
ent time, the Supreme Court has
been heavily concerned with protec-
ting the rights of defendants and
those rights of conscience specified
in the First Amendment and incor-
porated into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s concept of &dquo;liberty.&dquo; The
right to property has still been
clearly within the ambience of the
Supreme Court’s protective powers,
although the Court has applied
harsher standards of review toward
legislation impinging upon First
Amendment freedoms than toward
legislation affecting property rights.
This history, along with the total
experience of judicial review in the
American system of government, has
been most influential in the estab-
lishment of judicial review in many
countries of the world in the post-
World War II era.
Judicial review spread quickly
around the world in the first two
decades following the war. But the
American influence was most mani-
fest in the immediate postwar years
when India and the defeated nations
of the Second World War adopted
judicial review as a key feature of
their constitutional orders. India,
having just gained her indepen-
dence, established a Supreme Court
with powers even greater than that
of the U.S. Supreme Court. A reading
of the debates of the Constituent
Assembly, which drafted the consti-
tution of 1950, leaves no doubt of
India’s debt to constitutional practice
in the United States, just as Ameri-
can constitutional jurisprudence is
heavily reflected in the subsequent
growth of Indian constitutional law.
In Japan, the American influence
was absolutely decisive. One author-
ity on the Japanese legal order
writes:
The [Supreme] Court exists in its
present form mainly because of the
American victory in World War II and
subsequent allied Occupation of Japan.
On the surface, the legal reforms of the
Occupation were monumental-espe-
cially the establishment of a democratic
constitution and the creation of an
independent Supreme Court to interpret
the constitution and protect human
rights through the exercise of judicial
review. 12
American influence was less direct
in Austria, Germany, and Italy, but
still the exercise of judicial review
was cited and debated in their
respective constitutional conven-
tions. The Europeans, of course,
were themselves determined to
engineer new regimes of liberty
and to mend the cracks in their post-
1918 constitutions which had per-
mitted popular majorities to get out
of hand and through which dictators
had thrust their ugly heads. Judicial
review was available as a means for
limiting popular government and for
protecting basic rights; but Austria
and Italy, in establishing a judicial
review mechanism, followed the
civil law pattern of creating a special
constitutional tribunal outside of the
regular judicial establishment.
Austria reestablished its prewar
Constitutional Court and Italy
created a new Constitutional Court
imitative of the Austrian model.
The German Federal Constitu-
tional Court deserves more detailed
comment if only because of the
major role it has played in the poli-
tical system of the Federal Republic.
Created by the Bonn Basic Law of
1949, it owes its existence only
indirectly to the Occupation Powers.
True, when the military governors
commissioned the Germans to draft
12. Glendon Schubert and David J. Danel-
ski, eds., Comparative Judicial Behavior
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1969),
p. 122.
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a new constitution, they made clear
that the constitution &dquo;should pro-
vide for an independent judiciary to
review federal legislation, to review
the exercise of federal executive
power, and ... to protect the civil
rights and freedoms of the individ-
ual.&dquo;13 But there is no evidence to
suggest that judicial review was
forced upon the Germans. Fol-
lowing their own tradition of consti-
tutional review, they created the
Federal Constitutional Court-
paralleled by a constitutional court
in each of the German states-to
hear constitutional controversies
only, mainly between branches and
levels of government. In this re-
spect, the Constitutional Court was
to serve as the successor to the
Weimar Republic’s High State Court
(Staatsgerichtshof), not to be con-
fused with the Supreme Court
(Reichsgericht), which stood at the
apex of the regular judicial system.
While the judges of all the regular
German courts were barred from de-
claring laws void on constitutional
grounds, they were authorized by
the Basic Law to certify constitu-
tional questions arising in the
normal course of litigation to the
Federal Constitutional Court for
decision. Conferring upon the indi-
vidual citizen the right to file a
constitutional complaint before the
court was unprecedented in Ger-
many, and indeed was only statu-
torily based until 1971, when the
citizen’s right to complain directly
to the Constitutional Court was
rooted in the Basic Law itself. Even-
tually, the court came to play a role
far more significant in the protec-
tion of individual rights than as an
arbiter of federal-state relations, a
phenomenon that has also occurred
in the United States. 14
The German court’s authority
actually exceeded that of the United
States Supreme Court, for the Consti-
tutional Court was authorized to
rule, within the framework of what
is called an abstract judicial review,
on the validity of federal and state
laws merely upon the request of the
federal or a state government or
upon the petition of 100 members
of the lower house of the federal
Parliament. The court was also
empowered to determine, at the
request of the federal government,
the constitutionality of political
parties. (So far, the court has de-
clared two parties unconstitutional,
namely a neo-Nazi party in 1952 and
the Communist party in 1957. Both
were found to be undemocratic in
structure and antagonistic to the
principles of democracy.)
The adoption of judicial review
in Europe was not regarded with
universal favor, however. Some
observers, fearing judicial intrusion
into politics, had trouble reconciling
judicial review with parliamentary
democracy. Others argued that judi-
cial review simply would not work
in Europe’s legal environment, a
reservation that seemingly would
apply to Japan with even greater
force. Was it really possible for
constitution-makers other than
those with sugar plums dancing in
their heads to believe that judicial
review could be made to work auto-
matically by constitutional fiat?
Would judicial review survive in a
political culture where the judiciary
historically has been subordinated
to legislative and executive author-
ity ? Karl Loewenstein, writing in
1951, frankly doubted that judicial
13. Germany 1947-1949: The Story in
Documents (U.S. Department of State Publi-
cation 3556, 1950), p. 278.
14. See Kommers, Judicial Politics, pp.
215-32.
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review would &dquo;integrate itself into
[European] political life as the
unique regulatory force it is in the
United States.&dquo;15
The Europeans themselves, and
particularly the Germans, were well
aware of the abuses of judicial power
that could occur in a constitutional
order based on judicial review. That
was one reason for the concentration
of constitutional litigation in sepa-
rate courts. They were particularly
fearful of the American system of
judicial selection, and consciously
refused to bestow life-time tenure
on the justices. Thus, their justices
are nominated and chosen for single
non-renewable terms of 12 years by
the two houses of parliament, not by
the executive. This system of recruit-
ment, along with compulsory retire-
ment at the age of 68, constitutes a
strong check on the court and assures
that its political complexion will not
differ substantially from that of par-
liament or the nation. In Italy and
Austria, parliament also shares,
along with the executive and the
regular judiciary, in the recruitment
of constitutional court judges.
It is of some interest to note, finally,
that France had remained steadfast
in its opposition to judicial review
until quite recently. In a substantial
departure from the French tradition
of parliamentary supremacy, the
1958 constitution provided for a
constitutional council for the pur-
pose of reviewing the constitution-
ality of laws by parliament. But the
council was deliberately designed
as &dquo;a watchdog on behalf of execu-
tive supremacy.&dquo;16 Only the presi-
dent of the republic, the prime
minister, or the president of either
house of parliament may ask the
council to review a statute, before
its promulgation, on the ground of
constitutionality.
In the last two decades, judicial
review has spread to other parts of
the world. A 1970 study revealed
that the national constitutions of
nearly 60 nations provided for some
measure of judicial review. Most of
these constitutions were authored
by the emergent nations of Asia,
Africa, and some additional Latin
American countries. 17 Their judicial
review structures were based on
either American or European prac-
tice, or variations between the two.
Nations in which Anglo-American
influences were strong-for example,
Burma, Pakistan, South Korea, Ni-
geria, Tanzania, Uganda, and the
Philippines-tended to confer
broad powers of judicial review on
their highest appellate courts of civil
and criminal jurisdiction. Countries
under continental European in-
fluences-for example, Algeria,
Central African Republic, the
Congo, and Madagascar-tended
to establish specialized constitu-
tional courts of limited review. In
other countries-for example, Da-
homey, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal, and
Upper Volta-the highest appellate
courts were authorized to hand
down only advisory opinions on
constitutional questions.
15. Karl Loewenstein, "The Value of Con-
stitutions in Our Revolutionary Age," in
Constitutions and Constitutional Trends
Since World War II, ed. Arnold J. Zurcher
(New York: New York University Press,1951),
p. 217.
16. Jack Hayward, The One and Indivisible
French Republic (New York: W. W. Norton
& Company, Inc., 1973), p. 122.
17. Donald P. Kommers, Cross-National
Comparisons of Constitutional Courts:
Toward a Theory of Judicial Review, pre-
pared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of
The American Political Science Association,
Los Angeles, Cal., 8-12 September 1970.
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JUDICIAL REVIEW ABROAD:
PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
What larger meaning can be drawr
from this brief survey of judicia
review around the globe? Initially
it needs to be remarked that the
spread of judicial review as a formal
constitutional device says nothing
about its operation or effectiveness
Indeed, the judicial review powers
of many of the countries listed above
have never been invoked. This is
true of most African nations, nearly
all of whose constitutions were
written in the 1960s and many ol
whose regimes have since collapsed
or are under the control of a single
party or governed by a military junta.
In Latin America, too, judicial
review as an operative principle of
constitutional government-for
example, in Chile, Argentina, and
Brazil-has been washed away by
the rising tide of military dictator-
ships.
Ordinarily, we have tended to
associate judicial review with Anglo-
American influences and, as this
essay has shown, these have been
substantial in the development ofjudicial review in many parts of the
world, even in regimes where the
legal order and political tradition
were at variance with the Anglo-
American experience. Contrary to
the early expectations of Loewen-
stein and other skeptics, judicial
review has worked, and rather effec-
tively, in the &dquo;alien environments&dquo;
of Japan, Italy, Austria, and West
Germany. The acceptance of the
principle of judicial review in so
many other nations may possibly
have more to do with the idea of a
written constitution, as McIlwain
suggested, than with any particular
genius or influence of American
constitutionalism. 18
Anglo-Americans often tend to
associate judicial review with con-
~ 
stitutional governments character-
j ized by federalism, separation of
powers, a bill of rights, and an
1 independent judiciary. The consti-/ tutions of the world do reveal the
, 
presence of judicial review as a con-
’
stitutional principle in the large
majority of the world’s 17 federal
, systems of government. Yet it would
be stretching matters to say thatjudicial review is a functional con-
dition of federalism, for judicial
. review is found in numerous non-
federal systems. By the same token,
at least at the level of constitutional
principle, judicial review seems not
to be associated with any given
. pattern of executive-legislative rela-
tions, although it is usually found in
regimes where the judiciary is
wholly independent of the executive
and legislative branches.
A close look at the nations in which
judicial review has developed into
a vital regulatory device-for
example, Japan, Australia, West
Germany, Ireland, Canada, Italy,
India (until very recently), and sev-
eral Latin American countries-sug-
gests that certain political conditions
and legal values are as important as
constitutional structure in sustaining
a regime of judicial review. The
effective exercise of judicial review
in these countries seems to be asso-
ciated, with few exceptions, with the
following legal and political condi-
tions : a political order marked by a
durable constitutional tradition; a
pluralistic society with autonomous
groups free to oppose the govern-
ment ; a high degree of individual
liberty; an advanced economy,
usually based on private enterprise;
significant independence of execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial author-
ity ; a political culture characterized
by moderation and a stable compe-
titive party system; and a legal cul-
18. Charles McIlwain, Constitutionalism
and the Changing World (New York: The
Macmillian Company, 1939), p. 248.
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ture that places a high value on the
judicial role as an instrument of con-
stitutional change. These are gen-
erally the characteristics of middle-
class societies whose governments
are circumscribed by substantial
-controls. The judicial system in such
societies, suggests M. J. C. Vile, &dquo;is
the expression of the determination
to insure that certain values are
given priority at the expense of
expediency or speed in the perfor-
mance of certain types of govern-
mental tasks.&dquo;19 The most important
of these values are the high priority
placed on individual liberty, on the
one hand, and political compromise
between contending interests, on
the other-the kind of social context
that Madison associated with the
notion of limited government. These
liberal democratic values, so highly
regarded in Japan and in advanced
Western societies, are largely rejected
in the Third World where national
unity and the coordination rather
than the separation of powers is
vigorously stressed. Regarded as a
bourgeois luxury, judicial review is
likely to be increasingly rejected by
these societies in principle as well
as in practice. Judicial review also
lacks support in advanced societies
under Communist domination. So-
cialist constitutions, like that of the
German Democratic Republic,
which recognize no meaningful
distinction between social and indi-
vidual interests and whose purpose
it is to install a political economy
under the tutelage of the working
class, cannot very well tolerate a
separation of powers of the tradi-
tional Western variety.
India constitutes a classic study of
a struggling democratic society
which has sought to reconcile basic
freedoms and their judicial protec-
tion with the need for social policies
and programs sired by the legisla-
ture. In fact, the Indian Supreme
Court was a causal factor in the
recent crisis of democracy in that
country. A major constitutional de-
bate raged in Indian legal circles
over the question of Parliament’s
power to amend the fundamental
rights, particularly the right to prop-
erty. In 1969, in a landmark case, the
Supreme Court invalidated by a
narrow six to five margin an act of
Parliament nationalizing fourteen
major banks .20 The furor in Parlia-
ment generated by the decision
prompted the Court actually to re-
verse itself in the 1973 Fundamental
Rights case.21 There, the Court
emphasized the priority of &dquo;social
justice,&dquo; in terms of which, the jus-
tices noted, all &dquo;fundamental rights&dquo;
must be interpreted. One justice
even proceeded to undermine the
doctrine of judicial supremacy: &dquo;A
modern democratic constitution is,
to my mind, an expression of the
sovereign will of the people, ...
a legal sovereignty, which was pre-
viously vested in the British Parlia-
ment.&dquo;22 But the constitution was
also broadly interpreted to sustain
the right of Parliament to amend the
fundamental rights. The same jus-
tice wrote:
In the background of the Indian Consti-
tution, the fundamental rights were
intended to make all citizens and per-
sons appreciate that the paramount
law of the land has swept away privilege
and has laid down that there is to be
perfect equality between one section of
the community and another in the matter
of all those rights that are essential for
the material and moral perfection of
man.23
19. M. J. C. Vile, Constitutionalism and
the Separation of Powers (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1967), p. 339.
20. Salak Nath v. State of Punjab, 2 S. C. R.
762 (1967).
21. Kesavanda v. State of Kerala, 60 All
Indian Reporter 1461 (1973).
22. Ibid., p. 1969.
23. Ibid., pp. 1971-72.
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
remained a potential break on
governmental action in future cases.
Thus, when Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi (through the president) de-
clared emergency rule in India in
June of 1975, the full scope of
judicial review was among the first
privileges of the constitution to be
sacrificed for the sake of &dquo;national
unity,&dquo; along with the basic freedoms
of speech, press, and political asso-
ciation.
CONCLUSION
This essay has sought to trace the
influence of American judicial re-
view abroad. Men and nations alike
have marveled at the American
experiment in democracy, even as
Tocqueville did, and judicial review
has been an important aspect of that
experiment. On the whole, and par-
ticularly in this century, it has served
the cause of liberty in the United
States. And those nations which
have adopted judicial review have
also, for the most part, placed their
basic constitutional rights under the
protection of the judiciary. But, of
course, the liberties of a people
clearly do not depend upon judicial
review any more than democracy
does, for judicial review itself is an
extremely fragile institution. It has
proved workable and durable only
in stable constitutional democracies
which, like the United States, have
been willing to tolerate diversity and
a pluralism of interests while yet
seeking equal justice under law.
